New York\u27s Impeachment Law and the Trial of Governor Sulzer: A Case for Reform by Dunne, John & Balboni, Michael
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 15 | Number 3 Article 1
1987
New York's Impeachment Law and the Trial of
Governor Sulzer: A Case for Reform
John Dunne
Michael Balboni
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Dunne and Michael Balboni, New York's Impeachment Law and the Trial of Governor Sulzer: A Case for Reform, 15 Fordham Urb.
L.J. 567 (1987).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol15/iss3/1
New York's Impeachment Law and the Trial of Governor Sulzer: A Case
for Reform
Cover Page Footnote
The writers are, respectively, the Deputy Majority Leader of the New York State Senate and the former
Counsel to the New York Senate Judiciary Committee. In addition, the following people have contributed in
the research and writing of this article: Paul Rulison, Director of Research; Roberta Glaros, Senate Fellow;
Thomas J. O'Connor, Project Assistant; and Lora Eriole, Project Secretary.
This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol15/iss3/1
NEW YORK'S IMPEACHMENT LAW AND THE
TRIAL OF GOVERNOR SULZER: A CASE
FOR REFORM
John R. Dunne & Michael A.L. Balboni*
I. Introduction
Impeachment plays a unique role in our system of government.
It serves as the method by which a government disciplines an errant
official so as to maintain public confidence in the political system.'
Designed to check the gross misuse of authority, the impeachment
process must also guarantee due process for the official accused of
violating the public trust. 2 The impeachment of Governor Sulzer
illustrates that an unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious impeach-
ment process can be politicized, thereby diminishing the legitimacy
of a process designed to maintain the integrity of government and
the confidence of the people.3
At a 1981 hearing concerning the impeachment proceedings of
Governor William Sulzer, Assemblyman Maurice Hinchey (D-Kings-
ton) questioned the propriety and legality of those proceedings which
led to Governor Sulzer's removal from office in 1913. 4 After ex-
amining the facts surrounding the impeachment proceedings and the
law that permitted those proceedings to be conducted, there appeared
to be a serious lack of constitutional protections in terms of both
the procedures and the substance of the impeachable acts.5 While
no immediate prospect for the impeachment of any civil officer in
New York State existed at the time, the absence of adequate pro-
* The writers are, respectively, the Deputy Majority Leader of the New York
State Senate and the former Counsel to the New York Senate Judiciary Committee.
In addition, the following people have contributed in the research and writing of
this article: Paul Rulison, Director of Research; Roberta Glaros, Senate Fellow;
Thomas J. O'Connor, Project Assistant; and Lora Eriole, Project Secretary.
1. See infra notes 36-59 and accompanying text.
2. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396 (A. Hamilton) (new ed. 1857).
3. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
4. See Legislative Committee on Review of the Constitutional Process of
Impeachment and Inquiry on the Impeachment of Governor William Sulzer 77-97
(Apr. 28, 1983) (testimony of James T. Kirk, Jr.) [hereinafter Legislative Committee].
5. See id.
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tections was of a sufficiently grave ,concern for the legislature that
it decided to create a special committee to inquire not only into the
Sulzer affair but also into the laws of our state which authorized
such a proceeding.
The Senate Judiciary Committee found that the 1913 impeachment
proceeding resulted in a denial of both procedural and substantive
due process, 6 and that the constitutional and statutory provisions
are relevant today because the law under which Sulzer was removed
from office in 1913 is still the law of New York State. 7 Accordingly,
the Committee staff recommends several constitutional changes to
establish:
(1) A description of which public officials are subject to im-
peachment, which will more specifically ensure the application of
impeachment to every "state officer." '
(2) A more specific definition of what acts constitute impeachable
conduct-a definition broad enough to include a wide range of
misconduct, criminal as well as civil, yet specific enough to prohibit
the use of impeachment as a political tool. 9
(3) A clearer indication of the jurisdiction of impeachment and
when misconduct has to occur in order to be impeachable.10
(4) A recommendation that these provisions be placed in the
constitution to assure their permanence."
II. The Rise and Demise of William Sulzer
A substantial amount of evidence indicates that William Sulzer
was the victim of a partisan political act orchestrated by Tammany
Hall Boss Charles Murphy.' 2 Sulzer's record of public service from
1890 to 1912, both as a New York State Assemblyman and as a
United States Congressman, demonstrates his extraordinary success
and energy as a -public official whose politics blended the strains
of populism and progressivism that dominated both national and
6. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note.201 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN REVIEW OF REVIEWS 262 (Sept. 1913) ("Tammany
leaders and the powerful interests behind them had determined to impeach the
Governor in order to get him out of the way").
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state politics in the early twentieth century. 3 But Sulzer also had
a tendency to work independently of the party hierarchy. 14 In fact,
as a progressive, he dedicated himself to electoral reforms designed
to curb severely the power of party machines and bosses.
Aside from serving as an assemblyman and a congressman, Sulzer
also became the speaker of the assembly at age thirty, the youngest
person ever to serve in that capacity. 16 In Congress, he was chairman
of the powerful House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 17 allowing
him to exert his influence upon both national and international
affairs.
Although Sulzer's "political career was deeply tied to the New
York City Tammany Hall organization,"'' 8 his relationship with Tam-
many leaders was never easy.' 9 By 1912, however, Sulzer was a
nationally prominent political figure and he finally secured nomi-
nation for governor by the Democrats with the tacit consent of
Charles Murphy. 20
13. See Legislative Committee, supra note 4, at 82-85. Mr. Kirk noted that
Mr. Sulzer "was the author of more than [twenty-five] distinct bills embodying
progressive legislation" while he served as a United States Congressman. Id. at
84. These included:
A bill to establish a Bureau of Corporations; to secure better enforcement
of the antitrust law; establishment of the Department of Labor ...
something he introduced in 1904, which was finally passed in the House
in 1912 and in the Senate in 1913; a resolution to amend the U.S.
Constitution so as to permit the election of United States Senators by
direct vote of the people; advocated the income tax amendment to the
Federal Constitution... ; favored the publicity of campaign contributions
in the United States House of Representatives; . . . he authored the eight-
hour work day bill; sponsored and supported the establishment of a
parcel post and supported a law to increase the pay of letter carriers;
a bill to restore the Merchant Marine by giving preferential duties to
American ships, a bill for Federal aid in the construction of good national
roads; a bill to establish a Department of Transportation; a bill to
improve the Foreign Consular and diplomatic service; and a bill pro-
hibiting the sailing of any ship from the United States unless equipped
with safety devices.
Id. at 84-85.
14. See 4 THEODORE ROOSEVELT PAPERS 3 (1969) [hereinafter ROOSEVELT PAPERS].
15. See id.
16. See H. MORGENTHAU, ALL IN A LIFE-TIME 471 (1922).
17. See 4 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 14, at 2.
18. Legislative Committee, supra note 4, at 86.
19. See id. In 1898, Tammany boss Richard Croker tried unsuccessfully to block
Sulzer's renomination to Congress. See id. Moreover, from 1896 on, "Sulzer actively
sought the Democratic nomination for Governor of New York and was successfully
blocked by Tammany Hall." Id.
20. See 4 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 14, at 2.
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Governor Sulzer "was determined to choose high-class men [for
appointments to important positions] and clean out the prevailing
rottenness" in state government. 2' Moreover, Sulzer initiated a vig-
orous campaign to replace party conventions with direct primaries
as the method for nominating candidates for political office, enraging
both Republican and Democratic party leaders. 22 Relations between
the governor and the legislature had so deteriorated through the
winter and spring of 191323 that by the summer, the stage was set
for a confrontation between the popular, progressive governor and
the powerful leader of Tammany Hall. Finally, on June 16, 1913,
the two houses of the legislature passed a concurrent resolution
authorizing a joint legislative committee, chaired by Senator James
J. Frawley, to investigate "the [g]overnor's use of patronage and
of the veto in opposing the [liegislature's wishes on direct primary." 24
The Frawley Commission subsequently extended its investigation into
Sulzer's campaign finances.25
Based on findings of the Frawley Commission, the assembly ap-
proved the Articles of Impeachment on August 13, 1913,26 charging
Governor Sulzer with eight separate counts. These counts included:
(1) two counts of filing false statements of campaign receipts and
expenditures;27 (2) two counts of suppressing evidence; 21 (3) one count
of converting campaign funds to personal use; 29 (4) one count of
bribing witnesses testifying before the Frawley Commission;30 (5) one
count of bribing assemblymen in order to secure their votes for one
of the governor's bills;3' and (6) one count of using his authority
to affect the prices of securities listed on the New York Stock
Exchange.3 2 After a lengthy trial in the Senate, Governor Sulzer
was found innocent of five of the charges but was convicted of two
counts of filing false statements of campaign receipts and expend-
itures and of one count of suppressing evidence during a committee
21. THE AMERICANREVIEW OF REVIEWS 260 (Sept. 1913).
22. See id.
23. See 4 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 14, at 3.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 3-4.
27. See 1 STATE OF NEW YORK PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF
IMPEACHMENTS 46-47 (1913) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS].
28. Id. at 50-51.
29. Id. at 48-50.
30. Id. at 50.
31. Id. at 54-55.
32. Id. at 52-54.
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investigation.3" The impeachment court voted to remove Sulzer from
the office of governor, although it permitted him to hold further
public office.34
The impeachment and removal of Governor Sulzer raises the issue
of whether New York has a workable impeachment law that in-
corporates adequate due process safeguards against misuse of the
impeachment power by the legislature. Historical accounts of the
Sulzer affair have alluded to the confusion that became apparent
at the trial regarding the substantive and procedural aspects of New
York's impeachment law, confusion which contributed no doubt to
the impeachment of Governor Sulzer.3"
III. The Emergence and Role of Impeachment in State Politics
By the time of New York's first Constitutional Convention in
1777, England's impeachment law was firmly established for over
400 years.3 6 Parliament developed the process as a means of in-
creasing its own political power in order to counter the power of
the monarchy.37 Even with the impeachment power, Parliament ex-
ercised little control over the person of the King because of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.3" The King, however, would often
employ ministers and friends to effect illegal schemes39 and Parliament
needed some mechanism to "curb ministers who were [used as] tools
of royal oppression." 4 The power of impeachment served this pur-
pose well. 41
33. See 4 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 14, at 4.
34. See id.
35. See Legislative Committee, supra note 4, at 77-97.
36. See Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional
Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5 (1970) (impeachment procedure was firmly
in place in 1399 and during reign of Henry IV) [hereinafter Feerick].
37. See generally STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D
SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT-REPORT BY THE
STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY 4 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter HOUSE
REPORT].
38. See generally R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 4
(1973) [hereinafter Berger].
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See P. HOFFER & N.E. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA 1635-1805, 3 (1984)
("House of Commons found impeachment a potent weapon, exclusively theirs by
precedent, to chastise, weaken, and-if the Lords would consent-penalize the
king's ministers for corruption, infringement on parliamentary rights, misuse of
power, and other abuses of public trust") [hereinafter HOFFER & HULL].
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English impeachment law contained several features that would
later influence impeachment in America. The House of Commons
initiated the impeachment, 42 while the more aristocratic House of
Lords held the trial.43 Beginning in the fourteenth century, impeach-
ment trials were held for treason, trespasses and other illegal acts
in violation of statute or common law. 44 These impeachments almost
always involved a criminal penalty for conviction. 45 English im-
peachment language included such terms as " 'treason,' 'high treason,'
'misdemeanors,' 'malversations,' and 'high [cjrimes and [m]is-
demeanors' " to describe the acts that were punishable. 46 With the
adoption of these descriptions, Parliament attempted to include "al-
legations of misconduct as various as the kings (or their ministers)
were ingenious in devising means of expanding royal powers. ' 47
The right of impeachment did not immediately take root in the
American colonies." Impeachment, however, soon became a method
of challenging British authority49 and was ultimately transformed
into a means of ensuring that the independent state governments
did not revert back to an English authoritarian government.50 "From
a tool of provincial assemblies to chastise corruption in other branches,
it became a method for expressing the people's grievances (as enun-
ciated in their assemblies) against imperial rulers."'" Impeachment
was, in effect, an act of political protest.5 2
After American independence, the revolutionaries resorted to im-
peachment to address the conflict between virtue and corruption that
they believed was inherent in all republics.53 From their perspective,
the experiences of the first Revolutionary Congresses illustrated that
no government "could escape the dangers of corruption, misuse of
42. See Feerick, supra note 36, at 5.
43. See id.
44. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 41, at 3.
45. See id.
46. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 5.
47, See id.
48. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 41, at 15 ("American impeachment precedent
began almost inadvertently, in 1635, as a practical, local response to apparent
misconduct in a high place").
49. See id. at 10-12.
50. See id. at 14 ("in a series of cases argued before independence, the colonists
tested impeachment as a tool to resist imperial policy and assert the rights of the
lower house as the representatives of the people").
51. Id. at 41-42.
52. See id. at 42 (politics acted as catalyst of impeachment).
53. See id. at 61.
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power, and outright criminality. ' 5 4 American theorists, such as John
Adams, believed that " '[plublic [v]irtue cannot exist in a nation
without private [virtue], and public [v]irtue is the only [floundation
of [r]epublics.' "I' Checks and balances,5 6 limited grants of power
in fundamental constitutions5 7 and bills of rights" were partial so-
lutions. In the final analysis, however, only impeachment provided
an adequate remedy for public corruption and abuse of power.5 9
In order to perform this function, however, impeachment had to
be transformed from a political act to a legal process. Limits on
the power of impeachment had to be developed because the officials
who might be impeached were either elected by the sovereign people
or appointed by popularly elected officials. 6° Alexander Hamilton
clearly identified the central problem of republican impeachment:
How to provide for the removal of officials who either abuse or
violate the public trust, while at the same time ensuring that the
legislature will not use its vast power of impeachment for partisan
political ends. 61
Thus, impeachment raised a thorny problem for the framers of
the state and federal constitutions in the new nation. The impeach-
ment of Governor Sulzer highlights New York's struggle to achieve
a proper balance between impeachment as a legal process and im-
peachment as a political weapon.
IV. New York State's Struggle With Impeachment Law
Since 1777, the framers of New York State's successive consti-
tutions have wrestled with various solutions to the central problem
Hamilton posed regarding impeachment. 62 New York's first two
constitutions restricted the applicability of impeachment by creating
a special court and by defining which acts were impeachable. 63 Later
versions of New York's Constitution, however, shifted away from
substantive impeachment law towards reliance on vaguely defined
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 228 (J. Madison) (new ed. 1857).
57. See id. No. 47, at 222 (J. Madison) (new ed. 1857).
58. See id. No. 84, at 391 (A. Hamilton) (new ed. 1857).
59. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 41, at 60 (suggesting that without im-
peachment, only alternatives are assassination or revolution).
60. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 300 (A. Hamilton) (new ed. 1857).
61. See id.
62. See infra notes 64-104 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 64-90 and accompanying text.
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procedural and jurisdictional safeguards against legislative abuse. 64
The reason for this shift away from strict due process requirements
is unclear. The shift may have occurred because the framers feared
that a precise definition of impeachable acts would diminish the
effectiveness of the impeachment procedure.65 In weighing the bal-
ance between the rights of the accused and the effectiveness of the
process, the framers gradually chose to enhance the effectiveness of
the process. 66
The shift in New York's impeachment law toward weaker due
process requirements was well established by the time of the im-
peachment of Governor William Sulzer, 67 and thus allowed the re-
moval of a powerful political opponent by members of the legislature.
The lack of an adequate constitutional standard defining the acts
that were impeachable and the vagueness of the procedural due
process safeguards tipped the balance of power between the branches
of New York's government in favor of the legislature and permitted
a "political" impeachment to take place. 68 Thus, the Sulzer im-
peachment highlights the need for both substantive and procedural
due process within the impeachment law in order to maintain a
constitutional balance of power between the executive and legislative
branches- of government.
A. The Constitution of 1777
New York's first Constitution, adopted in 1777, established a
"bare-bones" impeachment standard and process consisting of three
articles. 69 Article 32 established: (1) a court for the trial of officials
accused of committing impeachable acts; and (2) a court for cor-
64. See infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
65. The more concise and succinct the definition of impeachment, the less
conduct it will encompass. See, e.g., CROSWELL & SUTTON, DEBATES AND PRO-
CEEDINGS IN THE NEW YORK STATE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CON-
STITUTION 436 (1846) [hereinafter CROSWELL & SUTTON]. Alvah Worden, a delegate
to the constitutional convention of 1846 "apprehended that it would be unsafe to
define in a law what offences should be punishable. For it was beyond the power
of human ingenuity to think of every thing that would be punishable. And to
name some, we should run the hazard of excluding others that should be included."
Id.
66. See infra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
69. See 1 C. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 181-83(1906) [hereinafter LINCOLN].
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recting any errors made by the lower courts of law.70 These two
courts sat together as one court and consisted of the president pro-
tem and members of the Senate, and the chancellor and judges of
the supreme court.
71
Article 33 established institutionally the power of impeachment
and provided a rudimentary impeachment standard . 7 The Assembly
was granted the power of impeaching all officers of the state for
"mal and corrupt conduct in their respective offices . . . -71 The
members of the impeachment court were required to take an oath
of impartiality prior to voting on the issue of impeachment. 74 Article
33 further provided that a conviction under the Articles of Im-
peachment required a two-thirds vote of the members present. 75 Upon
conviction, the judgment could extend no further than "removal
from office and disqualification to hold or enjoy any place of honor,
trust, or profit, under this state." '7 6 The article also provided that
impeachment would not bar an official from prosecution under
criminal law.
77
Article 34 provided solely that the party impeached had a right
to counsel. 78 Together, these three articles provided for a system of
impeachment that relied on procedural and structural devices. For
example, the impeachment court's structure guaranteed the partic-
ipation of judges from the supreme courts and legislators from the
Senate, thus providing for a forum that was both a political and
judicial body. 79 Moreover, the requirement of a two-thirds vote for
70. See N.Y. CONST. art. XXXII (1777).
71. Id.
72. See N.Y. CONST. art. XXXIII (1777).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. This provision became the focus of debate during the 1846 Constitutional
Convention largely because it raised the question of double jeopardy. See CROSWELL
& SUTTON, supra note 65, at 436. During the constitutional convention, delegate
Alvah Worden expressed the fear that "a party tried on articles of impeachment
• * . might throw himself on the great principle that a man shall not twice be put
in jeopardy for the same offence and he might plead his acquittal as a bar to an
indictment in a court of law." Id. In a constitutional sense, however, jeopardy
denotes a risk traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution where the pun-
ishment is loss of life or limb. See Price v. Georgia,: 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970).
The concept of double jeopardy has not been applied to impeachment in New
York State. See People v. Stilwell, 81 Misc. 456, 462-63, 142 N.Y.S. 628, 633
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1913).
78. See N.Y. CONST. art. XXXIV (1777).
79. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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conviction added a further safeguard to protect public officials from
partisan political impeachment.80
The convention documents of 1777 contain very little debate on
the impeachment standard. It was not until the second Constitutional
Convention, in 1821, that the framers addressed the impeachment
standard, and even then they addressed it with little debate or
explanation.
B. The Constitution of 1821
The Constitution of 1821 differed from the 1777 Constitution in
two significant ways: (1) it strengthened the standard for impeach-
ment; and (2) it reduced to a simple majority vote, from a two-
thirds majority of the assembly, the vote needed to impeach a public
official.8 While both of these changes, the first substantive and the
second procedural, were important, it was the change in procedure
that sparked a debate during the convention. 82
The proposal to vest the power to impeach in a simple majority
of the Assembly met with opposition, especially from Delegate Gen-
eral Tallmadge who argued that "impeachments were usually from
political motives" and that it was "not safe to vest this power in
a bare majority. '83 Similarly, Delegate Abraham Van Vechten stated
that he was "not disposed to put the rod into the hand of one
branch of the government [the legislature], unless there was some
limit set to the exercise of their power. ' '84 Delegate Peter Jay went
even further, believing the power of impeachment unnecessary be-
cause "[a]dequate remedy could be had in the courts of law for
those offenses that were not susceptible of sufficient punishment
from the frown of public opinion." 85
Chancellor Kent responded that a majority vote was permissible
as long as it was a majority of the entire Assembly. 86 Various other
80. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
81. See 4 LINCOLN, supra note 69, at 600. The Constitution of 1821 retained
the separate provisions for a court of impeachment and for impeachment by the
Assembly. The section specifying the right to counsel was placed in a general
section dealing with the right to counsel in a criminal case. The section relating
to the composition of the court for the trial of impeachment remained basically
the same. See N.Y. CoNsr. art. VI, § 13 (1821).
82. See 4 LINCOLN, supra note 69, at 601.
83. Id. at 600.
84. Id. at 601;
85. Id.
86. See id. at 600 (Chancellor Kent would not have objected to the section "if
it required a majority of all the members elected").
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delegates to the convention pointed out that the majority vote pro-
posal was substantially in accordance with the English rule that
permitted an impeachment by a bare majority of the House of
Commons .87
Although the delegates to the Constitutional Convention focused
primarily on issues of procedure, they did not entirely neglect the
issues surrounding substantive impeachment law. Several of them
expressed the belief that while impeachment provided a useful tool
for removing corrupt officials from public office, it had to be used
restrictively. 8 One attempt to restrict the use of impeachment was
an amendment that added the phrase "high crimes and misde-
meanors. '"89 This amendment reflected an attempt to apply impeach-
ment to both civil and criminal acts, but required that these acts
be of a serious nature, or an act of "high" criminality. 90 This
amendment narrowed the scope of impeachment, thus limiting the
possibilty of a "political" impeachment.
C. The Constitution of 1846
Unlike earlier debates, the debate during the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1846 centered on the issue of whether the constitution
should contain a substantive impeachment standard. 91
The definition of impeachable conduct, first included in the 1777
Constitution and expanded in the 1821 Constitution, had also been
placed in statute. 92 The placement of the definition in statute may
have encouraged debate on the continued inclusion of the standard
in the constitution. The Convention chose to delete the definition
from the constitution and, in so doing, left open to interpretation
the issue of what acts were impeachable. The parameters of the
impeachment law now rested in statute, 93 thus greatly enhancing the
legislature's ability to alter that definition. 94
87. See id. at 601.
88. See id. at 600-601.
89. See N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1821); see also 1 LINCOLN, supra note 69,
at 210.
90. See supra note 89.
91. See CROSWELL & SUTTON, supra note 65, at 434-36.
92. 1 THE REVISED STATUTES § 15 (1829). In 1827, an impeachment standard
containing the same language as the 1822 Constitution ("mal and corrupt conduct,"
and "high crimes and misdemeanors") was placed into section 15 of the first
volume of the Revised Statutes.
93. See id.
94. Amending the constitution is a difficult task: two successive legislatures
must consider and pass the bill and then the electorate must vote on it. See N.Y.
CONST. art. XIX, § 1 (McKinney 1969).
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A sense of complacency on the part of some of the delegates
over the need for an impeachment process may explain the deletion
of the standard from the constitution in 1846. Lemuel Stetson, of
Clinton County, commented that "[it was a proud tribute to our
state that hitherto there [have] been no impeachments." 95 Believing
that no impeachments would occur in the future, Stetson envisioned
the impeachment power mainly "as a warning to officers. '96
Some delegates, however, felt that they should retain the standard
in order to ensure that the legislature would not misuse the im-
peachment power. 97 Federal Dana, a delegate from Madison, moved
to amend the constitution to provide for impeachment for "mal and
corrupt practices in office and high crimes and misdemeanors." 98
The Oneida County delegate, Charles P. Kirkland, offered another
amendment to give the Assembly the power to impeach all "civil
officers of this state for corrupt practices in office, and high crimes
and misdemeanors."99
The delegates, however, rejected all amendments that sought to
define the impeachable acts in the constitution. The opposition to
these amendments was, perhaps, best expressed by Alvah Worden,
a convention delegate from Ontario County. He thought it unsafe
and unwise to define impeachable acts specifically, "[flor it was
beyond the power of human ingenuity to think of everything that
would be punishable.' ' 100 Worden feared that specifying only certain
acts would risk excluding others. °'0 Faced with the difficult question
of how to define impeachable acts without limiting the effectiveness
of the impeachment provision, the delegates chose instead to place
their reliance on procedural safeguards to achieve due process.' 0 2 As
a result, New York's Constitution no longer contained any definition
of impeachable conduct.
In removing the "mal and corrupt" and "high crimes and mis-
demeanors" language from the constitution, the delegates also re-
moved the language "in office."' 13 This left the constitution bereft
of any indication of when impeachment applied. The delegates thus
95. CROSWELL & SUTTON, supra note 65, at 436.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 434.
99. Id. at 435-36.
100. Id. at 436.
101. See id.
102. See id.'
103. See 1 LINCOLN, supra note 69, at 248.
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left to the legislature the task of clearing up this jurisdictional
confusion. In 1853, the Assembly Judiciary Committee undertook
a study of the problem.' °4
D. Assembly Judiciary Committee Report of 1853
The Assembly Judiciary Committee considered two impeachment
issues. 105 The first was "[w]hether a person could be impeached who
at the time of his impeachment was not the holder of an office
• . . of this [s]tate."' 1 The Committee's answer was in the negative. 07
The members found that because impeachment affected only the
officer's official status and could result only in removal from office
and disqualification from future office, the only basis for the ju-
risdiction of the court of impeachment would be an offense com-
mitted by a person currently holding office in the state of New
York. 10
The second issue was "[w]hether a person could be impeached
and deprived of his office for mal-conduct, or offences done or
committed under a prior term of the same or any other office." °9
The Committee's answer to the second question was also in the
negative." 0 The members determined that it was the prerogative of
the electorate to put into office any person it so desired, regardless
of the candidate's moral character."' The Committee ruled that a
person holding elective office could not be impeached for acts com-
mitted prior to taking office." 2 Thus, the Committee interpreted
104. See infra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
105. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIARY COMM. RELATIVE TO POWER OF IMPEACHMENT,
N.Y. Ass. Doc. No. 123, 76th Sess. 1 (June 23, 1853). The committee was directed
by resolution to consider these questions. See id. (resolution of Mr. Weeks). There
was a reference to the Committee being under a time constraint. See id.
106. Id.
.107. See id. at 4.
108. See id. -at 2. In reaching its conclusion, the Committee on the Judiciary
stated:
It is equally clear, from the terms of the Constitution, that the person
must be in office at the time of the impeachment: this instrument provides
but two modes of punishment, viz., removal from office, or removal
and disqualification to hold office; in either mode of punishment, the
person must be in office, for removal is contemplated in both cases,
which cannot be effected unless the person is in office.
Id.
109. Id. at 1.
110. See id. at 4.
111. See id. at 2-3.
112. See id. at 4.
19871
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
"impeachment" as applying only to acts committed during the cur-
rent term of office." 3 The impeachment trial of Governor Sulzer
some sixty years later, however, overruled this holding."14
E. Impeachment Trials and Law
Subsequent events have revealed that the debates during New
York's Constitutional Conventions on substantive and procedural
impeachment law did not settle the issues. Rulings made during
actual impeachment trials further complicated the debate over im-
peachment issues. In 1868, for example, Robert C. Dorn, Canal
Commissioner, was tried in the court of impeachments and ac-
quitted." 5 The standard used in the case was "mal and corrupt
conduct in office" and "high crimes and misdemeanors.""16 The
court chose to reaffirm the constitutional standard of the 1821
Constitution, which had employed the high crimes and misdemeanors
language, as opposed to the standard of 1846, "mal and corrupt
conduct.""'
In 1872, supreme court Justice George Barnard was impeached,
convicted and removed from office for official misconduct." 8 The
main issue of the trial was a jurisdictional one, focusing on whether
or not the judge could be impeached in his second term of office
for misconduct alleged to have been committed during his first
term." 9 The court of impeachment ruled that they could consider
the prior misconduct, since portions of that conduct related to acts
committed during the judge's second term. 20 Judge Barnard was
the only New York State official convicted by the court of im-
peachment during the period from 1777 to 1913.121 In 1913, however,
113. See id.
114. See Legislative Committee, supra note 4, at 94 (Governor Sulzer was con-
victed for filing false statements of campaign receipts, actions which may have
been improper but which occurred prior to taking oath of office). But see People
v. Berg, 228 A.D. 433, 239 N.Y.S. 670 (2d Dep't) (offer to bribe public official
prior to beginning of his term of office does not sustain conviction under New
York Penal Law § 378), aff'd mem., 254 N.Y. 544, 173 N.E. 858 (1930). See
infra note 184 for a discussion of the Berg case.
115. See 4 LINCOLN, supra note 69, at 607.
116. Id. at 602-605.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 607.
119. See id. at 605.
120. See id. (impeachment court "considered all the charges, which included
alleged misconduct during parts of both terms").
121. See id. at 605-607.
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for the first time in New York State history, the vast power of
impeachment focused upon the removal of the chief executive of
the state, Governor William Sulzer.
By 1913, New York impeachment courts had several sources for
interpreting the scope of the legislature's impeachment power:
(1) the records of three constitutional conventions; (2) the 1853
Assembly Judiciary Committee Report; and (3) subsequent case law.
Yet, the arguments presented at the Sulzer impeachment trial indicate
that considerable confusion remained over which acts were impeach-
able and the extent of the legislature's impeachment power. 22
F. The Impeachment Trial of Governor Sulzer
The impeachment of Governor Sulzer demonstrates that the ab-
sence of a clear and precise constitutional standard defining im-
peachable acts can increase the already extensive power and discretion
granted to the legislature in impeachment cases. The best example
of this broad power involves the actions taken by the Frawley
Commission, a joint legislative committee which was initially charged
with investigating "the [glovernor's use of patronage and of the
veto in opposing the [llegislature's wishes on direct primary."', 3 The
Commission expanded its jurisdiction to investigate Sulzer's individual
campaign financing and eventually proposed the impeachment of
Sulzer. 2 4 At that time, the impeachment standard contained in the
controlling statute, the Code of Criminal Procedure, was "wilful
and corrupt misconduct." 25 In its Articles of Impeachment, however,
the Commission broadened the standard to include acts committed
while a candidate for office by proposing that Sulzer be impeached
for "high crimes and misdemeanors" as well as for "wilful and
corrupt misconduct in his said office. ' 126 By including the phrase
122. See infra notes 133-47 and accompanying text.
123. 4 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 14, at 3.
124. See id. ("[i]t has been proclaimed in the voluminous literature on Sulzer's
impeachment that the Frawley Committee clearly extended beyond its legal bounds
in investigating Sulzer's campaign finances").
125. See 4 LINCOLN, supra note 69, at 605.
126. See 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 27, at 46. The title of the Articles of
Impeachment read:
In the Name of Themselves and of all the People of the State of New
York, against William Sulzer, Governor of said State, in Maintenance
of their Impeachment against Him for Wilful and Corrupt Misconduct
in His said Office, and for High Crimes and Misdemeanors.
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"high crimes and misdemeanors" after the phrase "in office," the
Frawley Commission was able to bring Sulzer to trial for election
law violations that he allegedly committed prior to his taking public
office. 127
Three major issues surfaced at Governor Sulzer's trial. One issue
related to the disqualification of the members of the Frawley Com-
mission and Senator Wagner, the majority leader of the Senate,
from sitting on the court of impeachments.' 28 The members of the
Frawley Commission had participated in drafting the Articles of
Impeachment, 29 and Senator Wagner was the successor to the lieu-
tenant governor upon the removal of Governor Sulzer. 30 Presiding
Judge Cullen resolved this issue by ruling that "there is this marked
distinction between a challenge to a juror and a challenge to a judge
. . . . At common law, nothing disqualifies a judge from sitting,
except direct interest in the case.""'' Judge Cullen further stated
that disqualification of members of the court of impeachment could
not "be extended or in any way changed from those prescribed by
the [c]onstitution," which prohibited only the lieutenant governor
from taking part in the trial.12
Another issue involved whether the legislature could consider im-
peachment during a special session called by the governor specifically
to consider other matters.' The New York Constitution provides
that, at extraordinary sessions, the governor must first recommend
a subject before the legislature can act upon it.1 4 Chief Judge Cullen
believed that this provision was inapplicable to the power of im-
peachment because the power of impeachment belonged to the leg-
islature alone.' Subsequently, the court overruled this objection. 3 6
127. See id. By putting the "high crimes" language after the "wilful and corrupt
misconduct in office," the Articles of Impeachment focused on two time periods:
one for actions taken in office, and the other for actions taken out of office but
which nonetheless constituted "high crimes and misdemeanors." See id.
128. See id. at 43-44.
129. See Legislative Committee, supra note 4, at 96.
130. See id. at 90.
131. See I PROCEEDINGS, supra note 27, at 44.
132. Id.
133. See Legislative Committee, supra note 4, at 96.
134. See N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (McKinney 1914).
135. See People ex rel. Robin v. Hayes, 163 A.D. 725, 149 N.Y.S. 250 (3d
Dep't) (appellate division adopting Judge Cullen's belief that nothing limited New
York Assembly's power to impeach during extraordinary session of legislature),
appeal dismissed, 212 N.Y. 603, 106 N.E. 1041 (1914).
136. See id.
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The third issue concerned the substance of the Articles of Im-
peachment, namely the question of whether the governor could be
impeached for acts committed prior to his tenure in office. 3 7 The
first two Articles of Impeachment concerned acts alleged to have
occurred prior to Sulzer's taking the oath of office.' 3 These acts
involved the filing of false statements regarding receipt and ex-
penditure of campaign funds and use of campaign funds for spec-
ulation in the stock market. '39
Some of the judges who voted. against considering impeachment
for prior acts based their vote on the premise that the "in office"
language contained in the statutes applied only to acts committed
while in office."40 The sentiment of the members of the court of
impeachment, however, was that the acts of a candidate cannot be
distinguished from the acts of an official.' 41 Senator Elan R. Brown
of Watertown noted that "[e]very day a public official is in office
he holds it by virtue of his election, and if in securing that election
he secretly committed crimes or moral offenses, or both those crimes
and offenses, he is guilty of official misconduct.'
' 42
One judge expressed the opinion that the crimes themselves, no
matter when the official had committed them, did not have a serious
criminal character.' 3 Conversely, Senator George Blauvelt interpreted
New York impeachment law as permitting the legislature to impeach
for whatever reason it saw as sufficient justification.'"4
Senator Blauvelt's attitude was pervasive among the impeachment
court members, many of whom felt that they had a virtual carte
blanche in determining which acts were impeachable. For example,
Senator Carswell stated that after having examined the constitution-
137. See 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 27, at 1749.
138. See I PROCEEDINGS, supra note 27, at 46-50.
139. See id.
140. See 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 27, at 1592-1600.
141. See id. at 1591 (statement of Senator Argetsinger) ("I find that the acts
of integrity and immorality are so closely allied" before and after taking oath of
office "that I am unable to divorce the two").
142. Id. at 1599 (statement of Senator Brown).
143. See id. at 1592 (statement of Judge Bartlett).
144. See id. at 1596 (statement of Senator Blauvelt). Senator Blauvelt stated:
Even though the limitations fixed by the Penal Law are included in the
statute, I do not think they are controlling or binding upon us. The
highest court of this State has repeatedly held that the Legislature cannot
enlarge the provisions of the Constitution. That being so, how then can
it abridge them?
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"the sole repository of the constitutional grant of power relating to
S.. impeachment" 145-he found an affirmative intention to enlarge
the grant of power from time to time as opposed to an implied
limitation upon impeachment.1 46 The judges of the impeachment court
finally voted by a margin of five to four in favor of impeachment
based on prior acts. 147
V. New York Case Law: An Analysis of Impeachment
Jurisdiction
The removal of Governor Sulzer raises three interrelated questions:
(1) did the legislature abuse the power of impeachment; (2) if so,
were there sufficient due process protections in New York's im-
peachment law; and, more generally, (3) had New York established
a device for removing officials who violated the public trust without
adequately protecting them against political misuse of the impeach-
ment power? Since it has virtually no standard for identifying im-
peachable acts, New York must look to the courts to interpret the
collection of vaguely worded statutes that make up New York's
impeachment law.
New York lacks both a constitutional and a statutory provision
for appellate review of the findings or determinations of an im-
peachment court.148 As a result, no judicial interpretations of ju-
risdictional or substantive impeachment issues exist. Nevertheless,
subsequent case law dealing with the removal of public officials
under other provisions of law has discussed the actions of the court
of impeachments.149 The effect of these subsequent decisions has
been to reemphasize the weaknesses of New York's impeachment
law.
New York case law has addressed one of the key issues raised
during the impeachment trials of both Barnard and Sulzer, namely,
whether the officer must have committed the misconduct while he
was in office. The parallel provisions of the New York Constitution
and the Public Officers Law relating to the removal of officers, as
opposed to impeachment of officers, specify certain acts which are
145. Id. at 1749.
146. Id.
147. See People v. Berg, 228 A.D. 433, 440, 239 N.Y.S. 670, 677 (2d Dep't),
aff'd mem., 254 N.Y. 544, 173 N.E. 858 (1930).
148. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1-37 (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1987).
149. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
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grounds for removal. Both impeachment and removal proceedings
require that the misconduct be committed "in office." 150 The ap-
pointing agency may remove appointed public officers, except judges,
for "malversations" or "misconduct." ' Proceedings to remove local
officials are brought in the appellate division of the supreme court
and, therefore, are subject to further judicial review by the court
of appeals.5 2
In the majority of cases involving the removal of a public officer,
the issue on appeal was whether the officer could be removed for
misconduct committed during a prior term of office."' The courts
are nearly unanimous in holding that misconduct during a prior
term of office does constitute grounds for impeachment.
5 4
The courts have recognized, however, that in certain situations,
they must make a distinction between "secret" misconduct and
misconduct that has been made public.' If in the intervening election
the public has received full disclosure of the misconduct, then the
intervening election is viewed as an exoneration by the public of
the wrongdoing and the courts have refused to hold officials ac-
countable in these situations. 56
For example, in Carlisle v. Burke,5 7 a town superintendent of
highways appealed his removal, which had been based upon charges
of "malfeasance" and "misfeasance" in his prior term of office.'
The court noted that after a full disclosure of the charges during
the intervening election campaign, the electorate returned the su-
perintendent to office. 59 The court ruled that since the supervisor
had received an intervening "mandate" from his constituency, his
150. N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 5 (McKinney 1969); see also N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW
§§ 32-36 (McKinney 1952).
151. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 36 (McKinney 1952).
152. Id.
153. See infra notes 157-87 and accompanying text.
154. See People ex rel. Burby v. City of Auburn, 85 Hun. 601, 33 N.Y.S. 165
(Sup. Ct. 1895) (councilman removed for acts committed during prior term); see
also In re Abare, 21 A.D.2d 84, 248 N.Y.S.2d 826 (3d Dep't 1964) (town supervisor
pleaded guilty to petit larceny committed during prior term of office); Corwin v.
Mercier, 14 A.D.2d 652, 218 N.Y.S.2d 718 (3d Dep't 1961) (town highway su-
perintendent removed for receiving kickbacks during prior term).
155. See infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
156. Id.
157. 82 Misc. 282, 144 N.Y.S. 163 (Nassau County Ct. 1913).
158. See id. at 284-89, 144 N.Y.S. at 164.
159. See id. at 289, 144 N.Y.S. at 166.
1987]
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
acts in a prior term of office could not form the basis for his
removal during the subsequent term. 160
Some years later, a different department of the appellate division
upheld an official's removal from office. In Newman v. Strobel, 61
a town supervisor sought to dismiss a removal petition which the
town board had brought. The removal proceeding, like that in
Carlisle, was based upon misconduct occurring in a prior term of
office. 62 The supervisor argued that he could not be dismissed from
office for wrongful acts committed prior to his current term and
that any wrongdoing in a previous term had "been washed away
by the action of the people of his town in re-electing him.' 1 63 The
court ruled against the supervisor because it was unclear that the
electorate had received full disclosure of his misdeeds during the re-
election.164
The Newman court extensively analyzed the precedents dealing
with the question of whether misconduct committed prior to office
should constitute grounds for removal from office. 165 In discussing
the impeachment of William Sulzer, the court noted that the governor
had been impeached "for misconduct which occurred while he was
a private citizen, and before his term of office commenced.' '166
The court pointed out that four of the five court of appeals judges
sitting on the court of impeachment had sustained impeachment for
misconduct committed prior to office. 167 The court stated:
The four judges voting in favor of the accused based their vote
upon the ground that Governor Sulzer could not be removed for
acts, no matter how reprehensible they might be, which were done
when he was not in office at all, and while he was a private
citizen. That is an entirely different situation from that which
exists here, where respondent was in office at the time of the
misconduct complained of, as well as when the removal pro-
ceedings were instituted. 168
In distinguishing the Sulzer holding, the Newman court observed
that the court of impeachment removed Governor Sulzer for acts
160. See id. at 290, 144 N.Y.S. at 167.
161. 236 A.D. 371, 259 N.Y.S. 402 (4th Dep't 1932).
162. See id. at 372, 259 N.Y.S. at 403.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 373, 259 N.Y.S. at 405.
165. See id. at 374-77, 259 N.Y.S. at 405-409.
166. Id. at 376, 259 N.Y.S. at 407.
167. See id. at 376, 259 N.Y.S. at 408.
168. Id.
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committed when he was a private citizen.169 The Newman court,
however, never reached the question of whether Sulzer was in a
private or public capacity, since in the Newman case, the defendant
was a public officer at all times. 70 In fact, the court held:
Mr. Strobel's tenure of office having continued for the past five
or six years without cessation or interruption, the entire period
can and should be considered as one continuous term, and he
can be called to account for his misdeeds committed at any time
during this period, even though the act actually occurred prior
to the commencement of the separate and distinct term which he
is now serving. 7
The consensus emerging from these cases is that the phrase "in
office," whether used in a context of impeachment or removal, does
not mean misconduct occurring strictly, within the current term of
office. Rather, impeachment may attach to misconduct committed
in a prior term of office.' 72 As the Newman court stated: "A public
officer is none the less unfit to hold office, and the interests of the
public are none the less injuriously affected because the misdeeds
which portray his unfitness occurred on the last day of one term
rather than on the first of the next succeeding term.' ' 73
The courts and the Assembly Judiciary Committee Report of 1853
have also agreed, however, that these prior acts may not be employed
to discharge from office an official who has been exonerated by an
intervening election.174 The finding of whether such intervening elec-
tion is in fact an exoneration is based upon whether the official
made a full and frank'disclosure of the misconduct."' This issue is
a question of fact for the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis. 76
An example of how New York courts have dealt with the issue
of whether persons may be impeached for acts committed in a prior
term is found in People v. Berg. 77 This case presented the court
with the question of whether a person could be prosecuted for
bribing an official prior to the commencement of that official's
169. See id. at 376, 259 N.Y.S. at 407.
170. See id. at 374, 259 N.Y.S. at 405.
171. Id. (citations omitted).
172. See supra notes 150-71 and accompanying text.
173. 236 A.D. at 373, 259 N.Y.S. at 404.
174. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
175. See Newman, 236 A.D. at 373-74, 259 N.Y.S. at 405.
176. Id.
177. 228 A.D. 433, 239 N.Y.S. 670 (2d Dep't 1930).
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tenure in office.'78 The official, the Queens Borough President-elect,
had not yet taken the oath of office when the defendant offered
him a bribe in order to influence the subsequent assignment of
building construction contracts.'7 9 The appellate division ruled that
an official's term of office commenced with the taking of the oath
of office and dismissed the indictment because at the time the
defendant had offered the bribe, the Queens Borough President had
not yet undertaken the duties of his office.8 0
The Berg court examined the issue of whether the "in office"
restriction, contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, was a
valid restraint upon the legislature's constitutional power of im-
peachment. 8' The Berg court was faced with the Sulzer court ruling
which broadened impeachable acts to include the acts of a private
citizen committed prior to office. 82 This holding conflicted with
section 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure'83 which limited im-
peachment to acts committed while in office. The Berg court in-
terpreted the Sulzer decision as holding that the Code of Criminal
Procedure's statutory restriction to acts committed while "in office"
was an unconstitutional limitation of the broad authority granted
to the court of impeachment by the constitution. 84
The effect of the Sulzer court's refusal to acknowledge the im-
peachment language contained in criminal procedure law was that
the court ignored any reference to when the acts had to be committed
in order to be impeachable. With this ruling, the Sulzer court not
only altered the definition of impeachable acts, but it also expanded
the application of the law to include acts committed prior to office.' 85
This expansion, however, did not necessarily constitute an abuse of
the impeachment power. There is little purpose in having an im-
peachment provision that is ineffective before an oath of office is
178. See id. at 434-35, 239 N.Y.S. at 671.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 435, 239 N.Y.S. at 672.
181. See id. at 440, 239 N.Y.S. at 677.
182. Id. at 440, 239 N.Y.S. at 677-78.
183. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1983).
184. See Berg, 228 A.D. at 440, 239 N.Y.S. at 677-78 ("majority of the judges
of the Court of Appeals in the Sulzer case held that the limitation expressed in
section 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was unconstitutional and that, under
the Constitution, impeachable offenses were not limited to those committed in
office") (citations omitted).
185. See Newman, 236 A.D. at 376, 259 N.Y.S. at 407 ("Governor Sulzer was
impeached for misconduct which occurred while he was a private citizen, and before
his term of office commenced").
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taken. Egregious acts committed while an officer is running for
office can be just as damaging to the office. The Barnard, Newman
and Carlisle courts, and the 1853 Assembly Judiciary Committee
also expanded the application of the impeachment law by concluding
that misconduct in a prior term may be a basis for removal from
a subsequent term, as long as no exonerating election intervened. 8 6
Consequently, the weight of authority justifies the application of
impeachment to misconduct that occurs: (1) in office; (2) during a
prior term of office or; (3) while an official is seeking public office.' 87
VI. Problems with New York's Impeachment Law
New York's impeachment law fails to describe-what are impeach-
able acts. Perpetuation of an impeachment standard that is both
vague and overbroad harms the process of government in two ways.
First, it restricts the ability of New York's leaders to be independent
for fear that the actions they take will result in their removal from
office. Second, it denies persons subject to impeachment notice and
due process. A law violates due process if it is "so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application ...."18 An impeachment statute that
fails to describe any action as being impeachable provides no basis
for understanding which actions the legislature has proscribed.
Unfortunately, no authority or history provides a clear definition
of what is impeachable conduct. The prefix "mal" is defined as
"bad, wrong, fraudulent." '' 8 9 "Corruption is more specific, referring
to an unlawful or wrongful act of a public official and to an act
186. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
187. It is arguable that while a candidate is seeking public office he is a private
citizen. He is, nonetheless, holding himself out to the public as a well-qualified
candidate, one worthy of the public trust. As a matter of common sense, if this
person should come into office, his acts performed prior to office will most surely
affect his office as much as those acts performed while in office. As one author
noted:
An act or a course of misbehavior which renders scandalous the personal
life of a public officer shakes the confidence of the people in his
administration of the public affairs, and thus impairs his official use-
fulness, although it may not directly affect his official integrity or other-
wise incapacitate him properly to perform his ascribed functions.
Brown, The Impeachment of the Federal Judiciary, 26 HARv. L. REv. 684, 692-
93 (1913).
188. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
189. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 861 (5th ed. 1979).
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designed to procure some benefit for oneself or another that is
contrary to public duty and to the rights of others. 190
The phrase "high [c]rimes and [m]isdemeanors," borrowed from
the English impeachment statutes, is also contained in the federal
constitution. 191 This phrase denotes "great" offenses and crimes so
morally repugnant as to make them impeachable. 192 One author has
defined "high [c]rimes and [mJisdemeanors" as those acts that "are
rather obviously wrong, whether or not 'criminal,' and which so
seriously threaten the order of political society as to make pestilent
and dangerous the continuance in power of their perpetrator."'' 93
These words and phrases do not give a very satisfying definition
of impeachable misconduct. For example, these words and phrases
fail to indicate how to handle acts of willful omissions, in which
the official refuses to do his duty. Yet, as a matter of common
sense, impeachment should apply to officials who refuse to carry
out acts required by law and who display intentional disregard for
a plain or manifest duty.
In adopting a definition of impeachable misconduct, one must
take special care not to be too specific; otherwise certain types of
impeachable conduct might not be included. 194 The definition should
indicate, however, that impeachment is to apply to acts that are
extremely serious, exhibiting corruption in some way, and are sub-
versive to the political process. The impeachment standard should
carry with it an understanding of injustice, dishonor and criminal
color, unbefitting of a person in a position of high trust. The standard
should guide public officials in the discharge of their public duties
and provide them with a better understanding of the type of behavior
that may result in impeachment.
Another problem with the current impeachment law is its failure
to specify the individuals to whom impeachment potentially applies.
The constitution currently contains provisions concerning the indi-
viduals who may sit on the court of impeachments, and who may
be excused from sitting if the governor or lieutenant governor is
impeached.'9 The constitution, however, fails to indicate which of-
190. Id. at 311.
191. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
192. For a discussion of the origin of the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors,"
see Berger, supra note 38, at 59-63.
193. C.L. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT-A HANDBOOK 39-40 (1974).
194. See supra note 65.
195. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 24 (McKinney 1969).
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ficials may be removed from their office by impeachment. Section
240 of the Judiciary Law 96 addresses this issue by stating that the
court for the trial of impeachment has the power to try impeachments
"of all civil officers of the state, except justices of the peace, justices
of justices' courts, police justices, and their clerks." '' 97
While no statute defines a "civil" officer, the Public Officers
Law does contain the qualifications necessary to hold civil office.
98
Moreover, the Public Officers Law defines "state officer" as in-
cluding:
[Elvery officer for whom all the electors of the state are entitled
to vote, members of the legislature, justices of the supreme court,
regents of the university, and every officer, appointed by one-or
more state officers, or by the legislature, and authorized to exercise
his official functions throughout the entire state, or without lim-
itation to any political subdivision of the state, except United
States senators, members of congress, and electors for president
and vice-president of the United States.' 99
Basic rules of construction allow the interpretation of "state officer"
as one who holds civil office and, therefore, is a civil officer as
referred to in section 240.
Failure to include in the constitution a clear statement indicating
which officials are subject to impeachment provides a potential for
abuse. For example, it is possible for the legislature to amend the
Judiciary Law to exempt its members from the reach of impeachment.
Can it seriously be contended that this was the intent of the framers
of the constitution?
VII. Recommendations
The meager constitutional references to impeachment and the sta-
tutory preoccupation with procedural detail have perpetuated the
emphasis on procedural formalities while ignoring the due process
rights of the accused. It is time for New York to address. this issue
and frame a comprehensive standard of conduct to prevent future
possible abuses of the impeachment power.
196. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1983).
197. Id.
198. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 3 (McKinney 1952 & Supp. 1987).
199. Id. § 2 (McKinney 1952).
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In light of the foregoing discussion, the Judiciary Committee staff
recommends that article six, section 24 of the New York State
Constitution be amended to provide the following:2°°
(1) Limit impeachment for "corruption, malfeasance, willful ne-
glect of duty and other high crimes and misdemeanors." '20'
(2) Define impeachable acts to include those acts committed "in
office, in a prior term of office or while the official is seeking
public office.' '202
(3) Make subject to impeachment "every state officer for whom
all the electors of the state are entitled to vote, members of the
legislature, justices of the supreme court, regents of the university,
and every officer appointed by one or more state officers, or by
the legislature, and authorized to exercise his offical functions
throughout the entire state, or without limitation to any political
subdivision of the state. '23
VIII. Conclusion
Despite the uncertainty of substantive standards and the legitimate
concerns over constitutional due process after the Sulzer trial, New
York has failed to fashion a workable impeachment law with ad-
equate safeguards against legislative abuse of the impeachment power.
Since 1913, New York has had three Constitutional Conventions.
The only amendments to the impeachment provision, however, have
been procedural in nature, with nothing relating to the weaknesses
discussed above. 20° Nor has the legislature addressed these issues in
a statute.
In 1971, the legislature recodified the Code of Criminal Procedure
and removed to the Judiciary Law the provisions dealing with im-
peachment. 205 As a result, the entire body of New York's current
impeachment law is contained in article six, section 24 of the con-
stitution, 20 6 and various articles of the Judiciary Law.20 7 The new
sections of the Judiciary Law continue to focus on procedural due
200.. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
204. See 1. LINCOLN, supra note 69, at 181-83; see also CROSWELL & SUTTON,
supra note 65, at 434-36.
205. See N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 240-248 (McKinney 1983).
206. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 24 (McKinney 1969).
207. See N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 240-248 (McKinney 1983).
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process and fail to fill the substantive due process void. 08 They
establish an elaborate procedure for operating the court for the trial
of impeachments, including a detailed description of the members
of the court,2 09 the seal of the court 210 the time for the holding of
the court,21 how service is to be made upon the defendant 2 2 and
the form for any objections. 213
Despite all of these procedural embellishments, New York's im-
peachment law still contains very little substance. As a result, the
only reference to impeachable conduct contained in section 240 of
the Judiciary Law,"" retains the standard of "for willful and corrupt
misconduct in office. ' 2 15 This vacuum demands legislative action in
the form of constitutional amendments.
208. See id.
209. See id. § 241.
210. See id. § 244.
211. See id. § 245.
212. See id. § 417.
213. See id. § 420.
214. See id. § 240.
215. Id.

